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In the context of profound, world-wide economic
crisis, socialist forces are critically re-valuating past
strategies. This process has produced analyses of
gradualist strategies from Eurocommunism to the
popular revolutionary models of Central America. A
common reference point in these debates has been the
experience of the Chilean Popular Unity (UP)
government of 1970 to 1973. Not only the Chilean, but
also the European and North American left, have tried
to derive 'lessons' from the Chilean experience for
their own struggles.
The UP, an electoral coalition including the Socialist,
Communist, and a number of smaller social
democratic and radical left parties, assumed office on
a narrow, working class base, and largely because of
the disunity of the bourgeois parties. The UP
government adopted a strategy of gradual structural
reforms aimed at winning over the petit bourgeois (or
'middle') strata, thereby isolating monopoly capital
and large landowners. The left parties were divided,
however, over the pace of implementation of the
programme, the appropriate role for mass organi-
sations, and the nature of the alliance strategy itself.
Subsquently the bourgeois parties - the National
Party (PN) and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC)
- joined forces in a strategy of 'hemming in' the UP
government with institutional and legal barriers, while
carrying out a sustained ideological campaign aimed
at re-establishing a centre-right hegemonic bloc. By
1973 the parties and class organisations of the grande
bourgeoisie had succeeded in asserting their leadership
over large sectors of the petite bourgeoisie. The
creation of this mass base was the necessary
.precondition for the success of the bourgeoisie's
appeal for military intervention.
The coup of September 1973 and its aftermath have
profoundly influenced the practice of forces pursuing
a gradualist strategy of socialist transition elsewhere.
Because of space limitations, a number of the nuances and
complexities of the evolving situation in Chile, referred to in the
longer version of this paper, have been omitted here.
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Italian Communist Party (PCI) leaders, in the early
l970s, saw in the Chilean experience justification for
their fears that the Italian bourgeoisie might succeed
in consolidating a centre-right, 'clerico-fascist' bloc.
The lesson the PCI derived was the 'necessity' of
forming a parliamentary alliance with the Italian
Christian Democrats, commonly called the 'historic
compromise'. Other left groups, by contrast, have
viewed the UP's defeat as showing that a gradualist, or
'democratic' road to socialism is impossible. In this
analysis we examine the crisis of the Chilean left, and
the divergent strategies which are emerging for
democratic and socialist transition. The Chilean
experience, both before and after 1973, offers
important insights into the problems and potentials of
gradualist revolutionary praxis.
The Opposition Projects
In Chile today there are three contending scenarios for
resolving the economic and political crisis: the
'austerity-authoritarianism' path of the military
dictatorship (in alliance with financial capital and the
US imperialist state); the social democratic (restricted
democracy) project of the national industrial
bourgeoisie represented by the opposition parties
grouped in the Democratic Alliance (AD); and the
revolutionary socialist programmes of the parties
within the Democratic Popular Movement (MDP)
and the Socialist Bloc (SB).
The monetarist economic model imposed by the
military regime after 1975, which removed import
tariffs, deregulated foreign investment and crippled
the trade unions, has increasingly divided and
weakened the regime's bourgeois bases of support.
While the working class suffered a severe decline in
real incomes and rising unemployment, small and
medium capitalists began to feel the impact of a
shrinking domestic market, competition from imports
and loss of state subsidies. The organisations of
national industrialists, big business and landowners
also became increasingly critical of the 'Chicago boys',
and found sympathisers within the armed forces.
Their quarrel was not so much with the political
project of the regime, as with its economic policies,
which were concentrating income and investment in
the hands of the financial oligarchy {Chossudovsky
1977].
The Christian Democrats and the Democratic
Affiance
At the end of 1977, the PDC, whose mass base includes
small and medium capital, technicos, and other
'middle' strata, began to call for a return to civilian
rule. The PDC had recognised that the junta had a
long-term project for restructuring the mode of
capitalist accumulation, requiring a rupture with the
previous consensus on national capital-led economic
growth. However, it was not until 1980, when the
regime imposed a new constitution reappointing
Pinochet president until 1990, that the fractions of the
bourgeoisie represented by the National Party (PN),
the Republican Party, and the PDC began to
reconverge.
By 1982, the economic crisis was severely affecting
almost all sectors of national capital. In that year,
industrial production fell by 22 per cent; purchasing
power dropped by 15 per cent; and unemployment
reached 30 per cent [Business Latin America, May 1982;
South, November 1982]. These conditions were
exacerbated as the regime continued to try to meet
IMF requirements for reductions in public spending.
Imminent negotiations over the huge per capita
external debt augured further austerity measures in
1983. Under these circumstances, many large
capitalists also began to view the 'authoritarian-
austerity' model as an obstacle to continued
accumulation, and to opt for a 'democratic' road to
capitalism. In late 1982, the PN, representing the large
owners' associations, joined the Christian Democrats
and some social democratic parties in calling for a
return to democracy. Mainly at the initiative of the
PDC, the Democratic Alliance (AD) was formed in
August 1983. It included, besides the PDC, the
Republican, Radical, Radical Democratic, and the
Social Democratic Parties, as well as the 'historical',
or Allende faction of the Socialist Party (PSCh).
The Christian Democratic Party or PDC has been able
to play a pivotal 'centrist' role in the Alliance because
of its cross-class bases of support and nationalist,
corporatist ideology. Its dominant faction has always
sought long-term stability for capitalist accumulation
within a framework of modernisation, economic
growth, and restricted democracy. Despite occasional
conflicts with particular capitalist fractions, the PDC
has formed alliances with these fractions to confront
threats from the left - as in the 1970-73 period. The
AD is thus not only a reaction by the national
bourgeoisie to the monetarist regime's attack on its
bases of accumulation; it is also a project to prevent
the left from extending its hegemony over the growing
popular resistance to the military regime. A key
element of this strategy has been to divide the left by
incorporating its parliamentarist wing into the AD.
The transition scenario set out by the centre-right
alliance includes: the resignation of Pinochet; the
'honourable' return of the armed forces to barracks;
the election of a constituent assembly; the formation
of a provisional government which will exclude the
MDP parties; and economic measures to revive
industrial and manufacturing capital. These measures
represent the maximum concessions which the
industrial bourgeoisie contemplates making to the
working class. Moreover, the PDC's strategy to oust
Pinochet relies upon an alliance with key sectors of the
armed forces, and hence on guaranteeing that
democracy will be restricted. PDC leaders have
explicitly excluded the MDP parties from participation
in both the Alliance and in the future provisional
government, and have proferred no guarantees that
these parties will even be granted legal status.
The Democratic Popular Movement (MDP)
The MDP, on the other hand - including the
Communist Party (PCCh), the Marxist-Leninist wing
of the Socialist Party (PSCh-Almeyda) and the
Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) - has ela-
borated a strategy for democratic transition based on
the convergence of the left parties and the formation of
a centre-left opposition bloc. Moving from their
former tactical view of alliances with petit bourgeois
and other social sectors (effected mainly at the level of
electoral coalitions), the Communists have adopted a
more organic conception of a politico-historic bloc,
urging the unification of working class organisations
in order to bring about 'the eradication of fascism and
the deepening of democracy' [Corvalan 1977]. Thus,
the PCCh has criticised sectarianism in the trade union
movement and declared its commitment to promoting
the development of autonomous popular organi-
sations. In practice, at least, the old 'dictatorship of
the proletarist' line seems to be giving way to a strategy
of progressive democratisation. Also, the relationship
between military and political struggle has been
redefined in terms which reflect the influence of the
Central American experience. The PCCh and the MIR
now envisage a mass-based revolutionary movement
in which military preparation complements political
work. While the latter still carries out vanguardist
actions, its admiration for the Central American
revolutionary movements has led it to place
considerable emphasis on the role of mass organi-
sations and a broad range of forms of popular struggle
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[MIR 1978, 1984]. Notably, the MIR was one of the
first organisations of the Chilean left to recognise the
importance of mobilising 'marginal' sectors such as
shanty-town dwellers and native groups.
The MDP parties have attempted to consolidate a
communist-socialist coalition at the level of party
leaderships, concurrently with joint actions at the
mass base. The PCCh envisages an anti-fascist front
encompassing the old Popular Unity parties, the PDC,
and other centre and social democratic parties, but
within which the left is able to exercise hegemony. This
centre-left opposition bloc would seek alliances with
'democratic' sectors of the armed forces, in order to
isolate the pro-Pinochet elements. Contrary to the
Democratic Alliance's programme, however, the
PCCh calls for the democratic restructuring of the
military and the dissolution of the secret police. In
addition, the economic programme of a provisional
government would seek to re-establish the gains made
by the working class during the UP period - i.e., the
minimal conditions for a programme of progressive
democratisation. At present, the MDP appears to
enjoy widespread support among the organised, urban
working class, and increasingly among shanty-town
dwellers, human rights groups, and other community-
based popular organisations.
The Socialist Bloc
Another group of left opposition parties - the PSCh-
Altamirano, United Popular Action Movement
(MAPU), MAPU-worker and peasant (MOC), and the
Christian Left (IC) - constitute the socialist bloc.
They differentiate themselves from both the social
democratic and the Marxist-Leninist currents of the
Chilean left. Their analyses of the failure of the UP, of
the project of the military regime, and of the existing
bases for socialist transition, have been influenced by
the anti-dictatorship struggle of the past decade, and
by the assimilation of new theoretical currents by their
exiles in Europe. Another influence has been the
evolution of mass-based revolutionary movements in
opposition to military regimes in Central America.
In general, these small socialist parties (called the
convergencia socialista because of their goal of re-
uniting socialists, and eventually all left parties) have
criticised the Marxist-Leninist left for failing, above
all, to rethink the relationship between democracy and
socialism. They explain the defeat of the UP in terms
of its inability to consolidate a centre-left hegemonic
bloc, pointing to the 'orthodox' left's instrumental
approach to class alliances and the 'ultra' left's
destabilisation of the government's agenda of gradual
reforms. Neither of these approaches to the gradualist
strategy, they argue, allowed the middle strata space
for ideological and political expression' [Rojas 19821.
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Middle strata support was crucial because of the
narrowness of the UP's electoral base and the extent of
bourgeois ideological hegemony. In addition, they are
critical of class reductionism - of the failure to link
'non-class' forms of oppression and popular organi-
sation to the working-class struggle.
Because of the experience of 1970-73, the conver-
gencistas place great emphasis upon left unity.
However, as we shall see, this goal is not viewed by all
tendencies as a precondition for a democratic
transition strategy. Their primary theoretical pre-
occupation is with the question of class alliances -
particularly with social sectors historically represented
by the Christian Democratic and radical parties.
Given that Allende's initial electoral victory was due
largely to a split in the bourgeoisie, and that the
subsequent success of the bourgeois opposition
stemmed from the ideological reconvergence of big,
medium, and small capital, the convergencistas seek to
exploit potential divisions within the centre-right bloc.
The tactics they are adopting toward this end,
however, diverge, and have profoundly different
implications for the outcome of the transition period.
Meanwhile, the two main opposition blocs - the AD
and the MDP - are both attempting to incorporate
the convergencistas into their respective projects. The
balance of forces shifted in favour of the Alliance
when the SB joined it in Fall 1983. This occurred when
mass resistance to the regime was escalating and
provoking violent confrontations with the military. In
August, Pinochet sent 18,000 troops into the streets of
Santiago to suppress the fourth national day of
protest. Twenty-six people were killed, 100 wounded,
and more than 1,200 arrested. Participating in these
protests was the National Workers Command (CNT),
representing almost all organised workers, and headed
by the leader of the Copper Workers Confederation.
Soon afterwards, the junta passed a security law
allowing the government to jail or exile those accused
of calling protests. Pinochet also attempted to divide
the bourgeois opposition through 'apertura' (opening)
talks with AD leaders. These talks collapsed when the
junta stated that it had no intention of speeding up the
schedule for democratic transition. Thus, threatened
by the upsurge of militant working-class opposition,
and by a loss of credibility following the (no)
'apertura' talks, the Christian Democrats sought to
enhance the AD's 'popular dimension' by incor-
porating the socialist bloc. Why, however, did the SB
agree? To explain this it is necessary to examine the
origins and objectives of the two strategic tendencies
within the SB.
The 'PCI tendency'
Within the 'convergency' sector of the Chilean left
there is a tendency (currently predominant), which we
call the 'PCI tendency' (after the Italian Communist
Party). Its roots are in the PSCh, which since the 1930s
has defined itself as a 'national-popular movement'
with a mass base among white-collar workers,
intellectuals, and professionals, as Well as traditional
sectors of the proletariat. The socialists participated in
various popular fronts before the UP period, although
by the 1970s a Marxist-Leninist wing of the party was
becoming critical of its parliamentarianism. Even the
party's left wing, however, differentiated itself from
the PCCh by seeking a more diversified class base, and
advocating international non-alignment.
Following the coup, many socialists sought asylum in
western Europe, where the 'Chilean road to socialism'
was a central topic of debate, particularly in Italy. The
positions of the PCI appealed to Chilean socialists in
key respects. Berlinguer agreed with them that the
main failure of the UP was not inadequate preparation
for armed confrontation, but the lack of consensus
within the left on the necessity to 'avoid the welding of
a solid and organic bond between the center and the
right. . . and instead [to] succeed in drawing the social
and political forces in the center onto consistently
democratic positions' [Berlinguer 1973]. With the
objective of resurrecting the 'Chilean road to
socialism', but on the new terrain of a mass-based
anti-fascist opposition movement, Chilean exiles
initiated the 'socialist convergence' movement in
Rome in 1979.
As we shall argue, the SB and the PSCh-Allende have
adopted a strategy similar to the PCI's 'historic
compromise', which, though drawing upon Gramscian
concepts, neglects key elements of his revolutionary
theory. The Chilean 'PCI tendency' has defined the
present alternatives as either continued military rule
or subordinate participation in a bourgeois-led
opposition movement. The SB's entry into the centre-
right Alliance, and its acceptance of the AD's terms
for transition, do not lay the basis for a left hegemonic
bloc as envisaged by Gramsci. The influence of the
PCI is thus crucial to an understanding of the SB's
current strategy.
For Gramsci, the formation of an historic bloc, in
which the working class exercises hegemony over its
allies and simultaneously dominance over its enemies,
was the primary task of the revolutionary forces. Only
by reference to an overall hegemonic strategy on the
part of the left is it possible to distinguish between the
self-restraint of the proletariat in pursuing its
economic-corporate demands, in order to effect
organic alliances, and the simple subordination of
workers' interests for the sake of tactical alliance with
the bourgeoisie. The PCI's electoral strategy has failed
to create an historic bloc, because the lowest common
denominator of agreement - opposition to fascism
and, subsequently, to monopolies and imperialism -
did not constitute the grounds for more than a tactical
alignment. Moreover, while Gramsci argued the need
for a two-pronged strategy, relying not only upon
'siege warfare', but also upon tactical use of force at
specific junctures, the PCI has repudiated any form of
armed struggle, and most types of struggle that are not
exclusively electoral and parliamentary.
The PCI's interpretation of events in Chile also
conformed to this distortion of Gramsci's analysis.
The basic flaw in the UP's strategy was identified as
the failure to effect a compromise agreement with the
national bourgeoisie. The tragic outcome of bourgeois
counter-revolution and imperialist intervention was
transposed to the Italian context. The PCI argued for
an alliance with the Christian Democrats to isolate
and defeat fascist elements, and to avert possible
destabilisation by US imperialism. In short, the key
lesson which the PCI derived from its reflections on
Chile was the need to make alliances with parties of the
centre-right, in order to implement a programme of
gradual reforms; whereas the lesson that the PCI
should have derived from the Chilean experience - if
Gramsci's analysis had been adequately applied to it
- was the danger of confusing unstable electoral
coalitions with power based on the ability both to lead
and to dominate. The UP had not achieved a
hegemonic position when it assumed office. Its
subsequent failure to build a hegemonic bloc, through
a parallel strategy of structural reforms and popular
mobilisation, is the key to understanding the bases of
the military coup.
The specific elements of this failure are too complex to
be discussed here, although chief among them is the
left's inability to establish an indissoluble bond
between socialism and democracy. The military
question can, from this perspective, be reduced to two
hypotheses: either the armed forces must be viewed as
the monolithic instrument of the bourgeoisie, in which
case there was never any possibility of a left
government achieving a fundamental shift in the
balance of class forces on the basis of a solely electoral
victory; or, there existed bases for exploiting splits
within the armed forces through successful propaganda
work and the demonstration of mass support for the
government. In this case, reactionary elements might
have been isolated, and the military democratised
from within. In the context of the current anti-
dictatorship struggle. we would argue, there are still
important lessons to be derived from the 1970-73
period.
Within the socialist bloc it is the 'PCI tendency' that
has led the bloc into the Democratic Alliance. In their
eagerness to win sectors of the bourgeoisie away from
the authoritarian-austerity regime of the military and
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financial oligarchy, these socialists have supported the
construction of a centre-right bloc. The Alliance's
terms for a democratic transition, outlined above,
have been defined by big capital, and its strategy relies
not on profound, sustained mass mobilisation, but on
the tactical use of overt protests combined with
overtures to selected elements of the armed forces. The
PCCh has been excluded because of its refusal to rule
out armed struggle against the regime. Socialist
participants in the AD, moreover, have joined in the
condemnation of such 'anti-democratic' tendencies of
the MDP parties [Molina 1983].
Like the PCI, the socialists in the AD argue that they
are constructing a broad anti-fascist front, which
serves to isolate the most reactionary sectors of the
military, monopoly capital, and foreign imperialism.
But while they have made a 'strategic union with the
political centre' their key objective they have not
created the minimal conditions for a hegemonic
strategy [Molina 1983]. This would mean, among
other things, a prior convergence of the left. In this
respect, socialists in the AD are repeating the errors of
the parliamentary wing of the UP. They have focused
on party alliances, both in the PDC-led opposition
bloc and with respect to a future provisional
government. While they claim to be in a position to
win away populist-Christian sectors of the PDC's
base, it could be argued that they would be in an
equally strong position to do so without any formal
alliance with the centre-right. The Church's sustained
opposition to the regime has created bases for mutual
action and theoretical convergence between Marxist
parties and popular, religious, and human rights
organisations.
Indeed, the Chilean 'PCI tendency' might well have
learned from the experience of the PCI in relation to
the post-1976 Christian Democratic Government in
Italy. According to Napolitano, a major element of the
(Italian) Christian Democrats' strategy lay in
'exploiting anti-communist sentiments and the
distrust and fear of a part of the electorate and the
middle classes . . . [while] it succeeded in arousing in
the most progressive part of its own electorate hope
and faith in the possible renewal of the Christian
Democratic Party' [Hobsbawm 1977]. Similarly in
Chile, to the extent that the AD establishes a 'national
consensus' on the terms of democratic transition, one
may predict that this will serve to legitimate a
bourgeois and not a socialist hegemony. In contrast to
the socialists' scenario of progressive democratisation,
the Christian Democrats have quite a different view of
the outcome of the transition. Andres Zaldivar, a
leader of the PDC, has stated that: 'the democracy that
is sought must be the same, democracy for democracy
and not for changing the rules of the game afterward'
[Zaldivar 1983].
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A democratic socialist alternative?
Thus, outside the MDP the majority of Chilean
socialists seem to believe that the only way to
overthrow Pinochet is to accept temporarily the
hegemony of the bourgeois opposition. There is
another tendency within the SB, however, which has
articulated an alternative strategy for transition on
terms more favourable to a socialist transformation.
MAPU and the Christian Left (IC) have been calling
for some time for new forms of political struggle,
breaking with both reformism and guerrilla 'foquism'.
They emphasise the promotion of autonomous
popular organisations, mobilised around grass-roots
concerns, which will gradually achieve higher levels of
regional and national co-ordination. These organi-
sations are to be encouraged to adopt 'mixed' forms of
struggle, and to view armed defence as a legitimate
right. One such organisation, associated with MAPU,
is consciously modelled on the Salvadorean Bloque
Popular Revolucionario. The Chilean Bloque Popular
Unitario participates in strikes, civil disobedience,
human rights support work, and organising com-
mittees of the unemployed, shanty-town dwellers,
women, and other sectors outside the traditional base
of the proletarian vanguard parties [BPU 1983,
MAPU 1974].
Despite the MAPU-IC position that left convergence
is a priority, their differences with the MOP parties
appear to be sufficiently great to prevent them, at this
stage, from uniting. Meanwhile they are seeking
consensus on the nature of the socialist project -
particularly on the strategy of alliances with segments
of the petite bourgeoisie, 'marginal' sectors, and
medium capital - and are focusing on convergence at
the mass base. MAPU, like the MDP, has called for a
complementary development of military and political
struggle, evolving from the advance of the popular
organisations themselves. The MAPU-IC tendency is
also preoccupied with the struggle for intellectual and
moral leadership in the formation of an historic bloc
- including the study of authoritarian modes of
domination, and the bases for the fusion of marxism
and liberation theology.
What sets the MAPU-IC tendency apart from the 'PCI
tendency' is its appreciation of the conditions for
constructing an opposition movement in which
working class organisations exercise hegemony. Not
surprisingly, they have looked to the Nicaraguan and
Salvadorean revolutionary strategies for practical
models. While they recognise the crucial differences in
class structures and popular cultures between the two
contexts, MAPU and the IC appear to have concluded
that the fundamental tasks elaborated in Gramsci's
revolutionary theory are valid for Chile, too. Once the
unity of the left and its hegemony within the popular
organisations have been consolidated, the next stage
of struggle should focus on political activities directed
toward those petit-bourgeois sectors allied to centre-
right parties. The eventual goal - again echoing the
strategy of the Central American movements - is the
formation of'a democratic, popular and revolutionary
government'. MAPU emphasises, however, that this
can only be achieved on the foundation of a
revolutionary historic bloc. Thus, the logic of
MAPU's position indicates an alternative to the SB's
current strategy of alliance with the PDC.
Conclusions
The two strategies elaborated by the 'PCI' and
'historic bloc' tendencies derive from a shared critique
of orthodox Marxist-Leninist praxis, and from a
commitment to a democratic socialist resolution of the
current struggle. Nevertheless, they have profoundly
different implications. We have argued that the
socialist bloc's strategy of alignment with the centre-
right opposition bloc reproduces errors made by the
parliamentary socialists within the UP, as well as those
of the PCI's 'historic compromise' strategy. The likely
outcome of the path to transition envisaged by the
Christian Democrats is, to use Gramsci's term, a
'passive revolution', that is, a transfer of power within
the ruling class to make possible a restructuring of the
mode of accumulation [Gramsci 1971]. Without a
dismantling of the repressive apparatus, and given the
restricted democracy to which the PDC is committed,
there will be little room for manoeuvre by the left.
While there may be a lifting of repression, the
fundamental questions of power remain unresolved.
The left must eventually confront the problem of
creating forms of revolutionary organisation capable
of carrying out a transition to socialism. The
alternative is to revert to a purely electoral strategy on
terrain even less favourable than that which brought
the UP to office in 1970.
As for the strategy outlined by MAPU and the IC, it
clearly envisages a longer-term struggle to remove the
military regime, which may be beyond the endurance
of a people longing for a non-violent deliverance from
an 11-year reign of terror. The influence on the
MAPU-IC line of the Central American revolutionary
process also raises the question of whether the
'political-military popular organisations' model is
appropriate for Chile. Yet the question is less one of
transferring models, than of utilising strategic
insights. Obviously there are important differences
between the two contexts, but the preoccupation with
the conditions for creating hegemony - for
constructing a true politico-historic bloc - is, we
would argue, an essential starting point for the
development of a successful socialist strategy in Chile,
as it has been in Central America.
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